The Almighty Renminbi?
By NOURIEL ROUBINI
THE 19th century was dominated by the British Empire, the 20th century by the United States. We may now be entering
the Asian century, dominated by a rising China and its currency. While the dollar’s status as the major reserve currency
will not vanish overnight, we can no longer take it for granted. Sooner than we think, the dollar may be challenged by other
currencies, most likely the Chinese renminbi. This would have serious costs for America, as our ability to finance our budget
and trade deficits cheaply would disappear.
Traditionally, empires that hold the global reserve currency are also net foreign creditors and net lenders. The
British Empire declined — and the pound lost its status as the main global reserve currency — when Britain became
a net debtor and a net borrower in World War II. Today, the United States is in a similar position. It is running huge budget
and trade deficits, and is relying on the kindness of restless foreign creditors who are starting to feel uneasy about accumulating
even more dollar assets. The resulting downfall of the dollar may be only a matter of time.
But what could replace it? The British pound, the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc remain minor reserve currencies,
as those countries are not major powers. Gold is still a barbaric relic whose value rises only when inflation is high. The
euro is hobbled by concerns about the long-term viability of the European Monetary Union. That leaves the renminbi.
China is a creditor country with large current account surpluses, a small budget deficit, much lower public debt
as a share of G.D.P. than the United States, and solid growth. And it is already taking steps toward challenging the supremacy
of the dollar. Beijing has called for a new international reserve currency in the form of the International Monetary Fund’s
special drawing rights (a basket of dollars, euros, pounds and yen). China will soon want to see its own currency included
in the basket, as well as the renminbi used as a means of payment in bilateral trade.
At the moment, though, the renminbi is far from ready to achieve reserve currency status. China would first have
to ease restrictions on money entering and leaving the country, make its currency fully convertible for such transactions,
continue its domestic financial reforms and make its bond markets more liquid. It would take a long time for the renminbi
to become a reserve currency, but it could happen. China has already flexed its muscle by setting up currency swaps with several
countries (including Argentina, Belarus and Indonesia) and by letting institutions in Hong Kong issue bonds denominated in
renminbi, a first step toward creating a deep domestic and international market for its currency.
If China and other countries were to diversify their reserve holdings away from the dollar — and they eventually
will — the United States would suffer. We have reaped significant financial benefits from having the dollar as the reserve
currency. In particular, the strong market for the dollar allows Americans to borrow at better rates. We have thus been able
to finance larger deficits for longer and at lower interest rates, as foreign demand has kept Treasury yields low. We have
been able to issue debt in our own currency rather than a foreign one, thus shifting the losses of a fall in the value of
the dollar to our creditors. Having commodities priced in dollars has also meant that a fall in the dollar’s value doesn’t
lead to a rise in the price of imports.
Now, imagine a world in which China could borrow and lend internationally in its own currency. The renminbi, rather
than the dollar, could eventually become a means of payment in trade and a unit of account in pricing imports and exports,
as well as a store of value for wealth by international investors. Americans would pay the price. We would have to shell out
more for imported goods, and interest rates on both private and public debt would rise. The higher private cost of borrowing
could lead to weaker consumption and investment, and slower growth.
This decline of the dollar might take more than a decade, but it could happen even sooner if we do not get our
financial house in order. The United States must rein in spending and borrowing, and pursue growth that is not based on asset
and credit bubbles. For the last two decades America has been spending more than its income, increasing its foreign liabilities
and amassing debts that have become unsustainable. A system where the dollar was the major global currency allowed us to prolong
Now that the dollar’s position is no longer so secure, we need to shift our priorities. This will entail
investing in our crumbling infrastructure, alternative and renewable resources and productive human capital — rather
than in unnecessary housing and toxic financial innovation. This will be the only way to slow down the decline of the dollar,
and sustain our influence in global affairs.
Nouriel Roubini is a professor of economics at the New York University Stern School of Business and the chairman
of an economic consulting firm.